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TUDOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND
LEGAL CHANGE*
SAMUEL E. THORNE
The century 1540-1640 in England was a period of profound
change, almost universally regarded as the dividing line between
the old and the new. At a point half-way in that hundred-year span
the educated Englishman's mind and world were still more than
half medieval; at its end they were more than half modern. Recent
work in fifteenth century agrarian history and investigations into
fifteenth century commerce and trade have blurred the black and
white of any abrupt transition from feudal to capitalist England
by emphasizing the non-feudal elements already at work in medi-
eval society and heralding its disintegration. In the same way,
studies in eighteenth century social stratification and commercial
and agricultural organization have made clear how distant the
society of that age still was from the industrial and finance capi-
talism of our own day. Thus exaggerated and excessively sharp
lines have been softened and the extravagant claims sometimes still
made for the period sensibly reduced. Nevertheless, it remains true
that in the years between 1540 and 1640 disruptive and creative
forces accelerated the normal process of change to a degree that
makes the century, unless we except our own, the most conspicuous
example of rapid and many-sided transformation in English history.
Revealed equally well whether one looks at religion or science,
politics or economics, literature, music, medicine or architecture,
the changes took place against a background of continuity, with
the clash and fusion of old and new on every side. Accurate scien-
tific observation did not drive astrology at once and in toto out of
the medical treatises, nor did medieval ideas on the supremacy of
law disappear in the face of growing parliamentary sovereignty.
Rather both subsisted side by side, incompatible and essentially
irreconcilable, waiting, in the case of one, further emancipation from
tradition, or in the case of parliament, a resolution dictated by the
turn of future events. So in the subject with which I am particu-
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larly concerned here: the dilution of a preponderantly agricultural
economy by the infiltration of commercial capital occurred only
slowly, nor was the transition from a feudal to a bourgeois or
embryonic-capitalist society accomplished everywhere or at once.
If in London and the home counties the changes were marked and
disagreeable, in Cornwall, the North, and the marches of Wales,
life -continued much as it had in the days of Edward III.
Contrary to the circumscribed opportunities of his no less
acquisitive predecessors, there was no limit to the variety of financial
adventures open to the Tudor merchant. A man of mixed enterprise,
his economic activities never were confined to ventures of a partic-
ular type nor specialized within a limited range. Patents and monop-
olies, loans secured by mortgages or penal bonds, the purchase and
sale of goods of whatever description if a suitable profit might
reasonably be anticipated, the financing of slaving voyages or
piratical expeditions; nothing out of which wealth might accrue
escaped his eye. But the means of profit brought most frequently
to hand by the exigencies of the age, with its rising prices and conse-
quent depreciation of fixed incomes, was land. Here the merchant
was joined by the enterprising yeoman who had amassed capital,
whether by land or sheep farming, by lawyers who like Coke, Pop-
ham, Ellesmere and Walmesley had made money in the law, by
distinguished civil servants and crown officials of varying descrip-
tions, and by others-all representatives of much the same inde-
terminate middle class. Just as their fathers had prospered on
monastery lands at the dissolution, this bourgeoisie fattened on the
lands of the ancient aristocracy, heirs of great but frozen wealth,
with properties dispersed in a dozen different counties, who found
themselves caught in the price spiral incumbered by the dead weight
of huge and passive estates, long leases, static dues, fixed freehold
and copyhold rents, and the great disadvantage of what had now
become wasteful and irrational methods of estate management.
The method of the new agricultural capitalists was to work the
land as a commercial undertaking, to watch costs and yields, to
charge an economic rather than a customary rent, to keep careful
accounts, to shrink from neither grasping chicanery nor evasion, and
to take at all times a realistic view of the cash nexus. Given a
knowledge of the ropes, a manor could be refloated as easily as a
mill. To the purchaser with the capital and capacity to undertake
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it, modernization was as profitable as it was unpopular with his
tenants. Customary payments dwindling, the new landlord could
get rid of unprofitable copyholders and small freeholders by buying
them up, or as more often happened, by twisting manorial custom,
screwing up admission fines to unreachable sums, litigating, fanciful
flaws in title until the limited assets of his tenant were exhausted,
or if these failed, by threats, duress, or intimidation. If the pressure
of the price rise could be avoided only if leases were granted for
periods of not more than seven years, there were a variety of un-
scrupulous means by which holders of longer leases, for life or for
several lives, could be discouraged and ousted. If there were com-
mon lands, these might be usurped and brought into cultivation.
The records of the Star Chamber bear witness to hundreds of such
cases and the despairing outcries of the villagers in their answers
to charges of' riot and the casting down of enclosures. They plead
ancient rights of common, immemorial rights of grazing for their
cattle, and resent bitterly the rapacity of the new rack-renting
landlords, merchants and lawyers from London, men of business
and speculators, who have taken the place of the old feudal land-
lords. Into this hated but rapidly rising class fell, as well, those
noble landlords who moved with the times, for such peers, living on
the profits and rents of commercial farming, are indistinguishable
from the merchant or trader-all equally products of capitalist
transformation.
The first response to this landslide, accurately diagnosed to be
responsible to no minor degree for the ever-present threat of serious
social dislocation that hung over the Tudor age, was repression.
In 1535, Thomas Cromwell contemplated an act 'that no merchant
shall purchase more than £40 lands by the year'; in 1552 it was
Edward VI's belief 'that this country can bear no merchant to
have more land than £100'; in 1559 Lord Burghley proposed to
set at a convenient figure a legal maximum to the real property
merchants and traders might buy; in 1576 the future acquisition
of land by clothiers was limited to twentr acres. But if the peer,
his wealth locked up in frozen assets, preferred to keep the parvenu
in his place, the latter, unfortunately, had the money which the
former was at his wits' end to obtain. Indeed, stronger objections
came from the gentry: those who had established themselves
earlier and were not averse to having the door selfishly closed to
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others who now sought to follow along the same promising path.
General legislation on this focal point never materialized, and by
the end of our hundred-year span opposition to the unpleasant,
grasping, crude, land-grabbing gentry, the exploiting and rack-
renting lord of the manor, was becoming limited to parliamentary
acts curbing his more violent interferences with tradition. He re-
mained, of course, an apt subject for the satire of dramatists and
the sermons of country clergy, but already the words were chang-
ing from 'grasping' to 'thrifty' and from 'rapacious' to 'enterpris-
ing', foreshadowing his transformation into the altogether admired,
solid and sober country gentleman of the eighteenth century.
If the Tudor agricultural capitalist farmed his lands, as those
generally did who came to the gentry from the class of smaller
yeomen, he could sell his produce in a rising market. If he dealt
in land as a commercial speculation, he could count on reselling
at a profit to newer recruits, fresh from trade, anxious to vary the
risks of commerce by the decorous stability of what was regarded
as a gilt-edge investment. What better use for money so gained
by profitable sales of produce or through shrewd speculative enter-
prise than the purchase of larger manors and broader acres? By
1620 if not earlier, it was difficult to find a prominent London
merchant or lawyer who was not also a constant dealer in land.
Coke owned at his death ninety-nine manors, but twice that num-
ber had passed through his hands. The same is true of countless
others. The land market was most active in the home counties,
where prices rose rapidly and length of tenure was short, reflecting
the spectacular growth of London and the profits that lay in supply-
ing its inhabitants, but what was true of the forty miles about
London was only slightly less true of the environs of other growing
cities, for example, Bristol. Elsewhere, though the passage of land
from owner to owner was slower, manors moved with a tempo
unknown in the middle ages.
Some members of this species, which was later to be the
admiration of the world, survived and prospered; others struck
no permanent roots. Since land often was in no way distinguished
from other business enterprises by a class in which agricultural,
commercial, and industrial interests were inextricably intertwined,
it was equally and readily subject to the ebb and flow of business
fortune. Reached by recognisance, statute merchant, and statute
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staple, mortgaged, re-mortgaged or liquidated as reverses required
or as more lucrative opportunities elsewhere were offered, property
floated from hand to hand, coming to rest at intervals only again
to resume its wanderings as financial embarrassment, bankruptcy,
or the promise of larger profits called the turn. Of 2,500 manors
in seven counties whose owners can be traced, 33 per-cent were
sold between 1560 and 1600;. 36 per-cent between 1601 and 1640.
Of 600 manors in Hertfordshire and Surrey, close enough to Lon-
don to feel the wash of the whirlpool, 40 per-cent changed hands
in the same periods. Of the gentry who had purchased land in
Bedfordshire by 1620, two-thirds were said to have sold out by 1668,
and the remark that half the properties in conservative Stafford-
shire had changed hands in sixty years does not appear too im-
plausible.
Other crises set the wheel spinning at an even faster rate.
Between 1558 and 1633 crown lands to the value of £2,250,000
(much of the total after 1605, to satisfy the government's deficit
spending of the war years) were sold, largely to syndicates of
London financiers, who bought in substantial blocks, subdivided,
and resold, partly to subsidiary rings of middlemen, partly to the
public. Thus political conditions combined with economic to erode
the upper strata of the social pyramid-the crown and the peerage
-and to increase the amount of property that passed into new
hands.
Since land was an instrument of social prestige and political
power, its mobilization had other effects, and the shifting center
of gravity in the State, to which rather more attention has been
paid by historians, affords an opportunity to view the leveling
process from another side. Of 135 peers in the House of Lords in
1640, over half had obtained their titles since 1603: the creation
by the Stuarts of a new nobility through the sale of titles to knights
and esquires with an income from land of E1000 a year was nothing
beyond a simple recognition of economic realities. Such trans-
lations obscure the picture, but peers so recruited from the gentry,
though they sometimes bore ancient names, had neither the wealth,
power, nor prestige of those who earlier had sat in their seats.
The landslide had turned the upper ranges of English society from
a precipitous mountain chain to an undulating high table land, on
which variations in altitude were recognizable but, compared with
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the tremendous peaks of an earlier age, small. The richer gentry
had the income of Earls and in 1628 it was quite properly ob-
served that the Commons could buy the House of Lords three
times over. Clearly the substantial gentry entrenched in the
Commons, commanding most of the land and therefore most of
the wealth of an England still largely agricultural, held the keys
to what seemed the indefinite future in its hands. Nor would this
be altered in essentials until the factories and the long industrial
streets came to modify the face of England and transmute one
world of privilege into another.
If the repercussions of the 1540-1640 redistribution of
landed property were many and of profound importance in Eng-
lish history, I touch upon them only to illustrate the extent to
which land had been transferred from crown and peerage to a
gentry closely allied with, in fact indistinguishable from, the
merchant class. The flow of commercial capital into land, which
rationalized estate management, likewise modernized portions of the
law of real property. Such changes seldom took the form of sharp
reversals of earlier rules, but a shift in emphasis, a choice of alter-
natives, a heightened importance given to a case formerly ignored,
the sudden blossoming of a doctrine barely hinted at earlier, the
broader construction of statutory words, mark the transformation
well enough.
Security, for example, was a matter of the greatest concern to
purchasers, who feared most the remote or dormant title, brought
forward without warning, against which the law left them helpless.
These fears were well founded, for financially pinched sellers did
not scruple to defraud the business men and speculators, ruthless
bargainers determined to force acceptance of the lowest prices, who
were insinuating themselves into the land. The common law did
not require disclosure of defects in title and afforded no means for
destroying outstanding claims. Rather, in true medieval fashion,
it preserved indefinitely the rights of heirs and remaindermen and
protected latent titles against purchasers of every kind. In the
interests of security legal ingenuity sanctioned by the judiciary
developed the common recovery, at best a bare-faced fraud since
there was no possibility of recompense from the common vouchee,
but a fraud to which the courts resolutely closed their eyes, thus
depriving heirs in tail, by an obvious fiction, of their inheritances.
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A questionable antiquity was given the device by alleging as its
origin a singularly obscure case of 1472, though the common re-
covery itself did not become usual until almost a century later.
De donis had enacted expressly that a fine was no bar to the issue
in tail and a statute of 1536, dealing with the general subject of
fines, did not repeal it. Nevertheless, a strained judicial interpre-
tation of the act declared it to be a bar and set a five-year statute
of limitations running against remaindermen and reversioners which
barred their rights absolutely and finally. Though it made the fine
'a piece of firm ground in the midst of shifting quicksands', this
reading of the statute was implausible enough to raise questions,
but it was quickly confirmed in 1540. Since the fee tail, a fully
recognized and legal estate, now could be barred by fine or recovery,
efforts were made to create estates tail that could not be so upset,
a legitimate aim for an owner seeking to establish a landed family.
But judges, more concerned with the fact that 'titles would be wholly
uncertain' and the plight of a prospective purchaser of property so.
encumbered than with the owner's aspirations, found all such devices
void. They continued to emphasize the destructible nature of estates
in tail until the end of the seventeenth century, when they became
willing to accept the work of conveyancers creating entails impos-
sible to break-a reversal closely tied in with the diversion of com-
mercial money from land to industry in the eighteenth century and
the re-establishment of a large-landed aristocraty.
Among the more conspicuous signs of agricultural backwardness
in 1550 was the lease for lives, most frequently found on the estates
of the aristocracy, which had been granted when falling, not rising,
prices had been the great landholder's problem and fixed rents for
long terms were an insurance. Manors whose lands were held on
long leases at low rentals attracted the Tudor speculator prepared
to modernize, whose profit was measured by the difference between
the improved and old rents. Short-term leases were the standard
answer to the price rise, and as they became common the position
of the tenant for years improved considerably. Precarious in an
earlier age that had regarded land as the permanent and normal
economic basis for the family and had distrusted the termor, who
more often than not was a money-lender evading the law against
usury, the entreprenurial activity of the termor was so far condoned
that freeholders, envying the means given him for recovering his
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 26
HeinOnline  -- 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 16 1951
TUDOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
term, secured the same advantages to themselves by the fictitious
demise in the action of ejectment.
English land law was organized about the concept of seisin:
neither possession nor ownership but a combination of both. To
have seisin one must enter upon land and stay there, though the
seisin so acquired might or might not be superior to another's older
and better seisin. A conception peculiar to the middle ages, it was
unsatisfactory in an age when property moved rapidly and in which
buyers dealt in land they had never seen and did not expect to
occupy. The growth of the concept of title, only hinted at before
Elizabethan times, is reflected in the new importance given title-
deeds, originally simply memoranda of livery of seisin. Actions for
their recovery became frequent and their simple deposit was held in
1673 to effect a valid mortgage. In the light of this separation of
title from possession, seisin was equated with the latter. Livery
of seisin-an actual, complete, and public change in the occupancy
of land-declined into mere form as title was transferred by bar-
gain and sale or by lease and release. At these and other points,
often technical and small but not unimportant as harbingers of the
future, transformation was slowly taking place.
To the speculating Elizabethan purchaser buying to improve
and sell, or to hold subject to the reconversion of his capital into
enterprises of other kinds, there was much that seemed antiquated
in the English law of real property. To the Elizabethan merchant
acquiring two or three thousand acres with the intention of estab-
lishing a landed family of significance in the county, the law of
real property, a product of the heroic age of feudalism when the
nexus between lord and tenant had been not merely economic, but
military, social, and psychological, was an outrage. Though he
might buy knowing nothing of, and caring less about, his lord para-
mount, in legal contemplation his land was held of a superior in the
feudal pyramid and, if held by knight service, a tenure more likely
than any other, was subject to substantial burdens surviving from
the feudal-age. The most severe of these, wardship and marriage,
took effect at the tenant's death, seriously limiting the estate passed
on to his heir and interfering to a prominent degree with his dynastic
pretensions. For centuries intermittent skirmishes had been fought
against the feudal incidents, tenants in every age having been
anxious to transmit their lands free of their burden. The Statute
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of Uses, four years before our period begins, had closed off the most
useful evasory device. But in the second half of the sixteenth cen-
tury the hundred-year war began in earnest. Fought through the
Elizabethan and Jacobean courts, its battles enshrined in case after
case in the black-letter reports, the long struggle was technical in
the extreme and left as its monument a mass of subtlety and mis-
directed ingenuity whose effect on our property law was considerable
and greatly to its detriment.
Since the principle that lay at the root of both prerogative and
simple wardship was that it attached to one who entered as heir of
the deceased tenant, the problem was to enable the heir to succeed
to the land by some means other than inheritance. The rule in
Shelley's case fixed the character of heirs upon persons whom con-
veyancers had represented to be purchasers, but this was a simple
and obvious device, easily penetrated. At the bidding of their clients,
lawyers resorted to progressively elaborate and increasingly tech-
nical schemes, some to take effect inter vivos others only at death,
to make heirs purchasers, even at a number of removes from the
donor. The contingent remainder, which makes its first appearance
in Elizabeth's reign, is a product of this effort, as are shifting and
springing uses: all directed toward the same end. Since there were
other ingenious means of solving the problem, the long term of years,
99 years or 999 years, unknown in the middle ages, comes into
prominence: not being an estate of inheritance, the feudal incidents
did not attach to it. The running battle of wits may be traced in
the books, but efforts to transmit land free of its medieval dues and
incidents were doomed to failure when carried on within the tradi-
tional law of real property, itself painfully forged for the governance
of a feudal society in which those very dues and incidents were of
major importance. Casuistical alterations in detail accomplished
something, but more often raised frightening problems of other
kinds, notably the perpetuity, like the others a problem first grappled
with in the Elizabethan age. The courts moving slowly from case
to case met the question always as one of meum et tuum, for if six-
teenth century landholders as tenants felt the feudal incidents intoler-
able, as lords they were anxious not to be deprived unjustly of rights
guaranteed them by law. Pressure was less ambiguous and more
readily felt in Parliament. The incidents of tenure were abolished
in 1660, unfortunately without the concomitant abolition of the
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tortured law of real property to which they had given rise, a law
that was to confound judges for two centuries and disprove the
maxim cessat causa, cessat effectus.
The slow emergence of contract from tort and the halting
development of assumpsit in a strikingly active commercial society
pose problems for the sociological jurist and have led historians into
alternate misconceptions. To some, familiar with the extent to which
business economy pervaded contemporary life, the needs of com-
merce in the sixteenth century were served in the local courts. But
it can be nothing more than unlikely that yokels in the country
were the beneficiaries of a commercial law, developed locally, while
the large-scale trade of Elizabethan London or Bristol made do with
the rudimentary contractual concepts of the common law. Other
historians have postponed the emergence of developed commercial
activity in England until Slade's case, or at least until Strang-
borough v. Warner (1588) in an effort to balance the equation by
manipulating its other variable. But there can be little doubt that
the turbulent business activity of the sixteenth century took place,
as might be expected, within inherited forms. The ubiquitous bond,
the recognisance, the statute merchant, and the statute staple, all
were medieval and all had their origins in the simple relationship
of debtor and creditor.
I need not expand on the familiar bond under seal, usually
drawn to twice the amount due and defeasible by payment of half
face value, nor on the action of debt that was used to enforce it.
A creditor could avoid the necessity of having to bring an action
of debt by having his debtor appear before a superior court, or
more frequently before a clerk in the offices of the chancery of
exchequer, and there enter into a recognisance, duly enrolled, where-
by he acknowledged the indebtedness and submitted to immediate
execution upon non-payment. His position was the same as if he
had been successfully sued upon a writ of debt. The Statute of
Merchants of 1285 set up registries in a number of towns before
whom the creditor might have his debtor appear and acknowledge
the debt. If this form of assurance was adopted, rather more drastic
remedies were available on default. The debtor was forthwith com-
mitted to prison; during his first three months there he had facilities
for selling his chattels and lands to satisfy the debt, but if he failed
to do so, all his chattels then were given to the creditor, to be sold
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and deducted from the amount due. If this was insufficient, all his
lands were transferred to the creditor until the remainder of the
debt was discharged out of their issues. The Statute of Staples of
1353 provided much the same method of acknowledgment, but before
the Mayor of any Staple town, and similarly direct methods of
collection. It seems to have been intended only for Merchant-
Staplers, but the general public nevertheless continued to use it
until the statute of 1532 confined it to Staplers and created for others
the 'recognisance in the nature of a statute staple' entered into
before the chief justices of either bench or the recorder of London.
Situations later recognized as within the sphere of the normal
contract relation were dealt with in the sixteenth century and later
by means of these devices. Defeasible bonds, statutes merchant or
statutes staple, served the purposes of the unilateral contract. A
bound himself in a bond of £1200 to B and C defeasible on his
paying each of Richard Hooker's four daughters £100 at her full
age. A bound himself in the sum of £20 to deliver certain goods at
Boston, Lincolnshire. A bound himself on a bond defeasible on his
rebuilding a tenement, barn, and watermill. A bound himself in
a bond of £100 to B, it to be of no effect if B did not cure him of
the pox. The same instruments also served the purposes of the
bilateral contract. A gave his bond of £500 to the purchaser of
his land defeasible on his making the buyer a sufficient estate prior
to a fixed date; in return B gave his bond of £500 defeasible on
payment of the purchase price. A agreed to sell goods at £800 pay-
able the 15th of August; B agreed to buy. But these preliminary
negotiations were further assured by the exchange of £1000 bonds:
A's to remain in full force until he transferred the goods; B's until
payment was made. A agreed to marry B's daughter, B to make
an estate to A, the daughter, and the heirs of their bodies. Here
likewise, final arrangements took the form of an exchange of de-
feasible bonds. The same results could be achieved by the recog-
nition of reciprocal statutes merchant or staple containing similar
defeasances, transactions already common in the fifteenth century.
It is a tempting hypothesis that the cases that came before
the common law courts during the sixteenth century, out of which
the action of assumpsit grew, were those in which the preliminary
bargain had not been followed by the exchange of assurances, either
because of the insignificance of the sums involved or the inexperience
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of the parties. The cases which together comprise the traditional
history of contracts have an unmistakable flavor of unsophistication
and leave the impression that Tudor commercial activity was con-
fined to the dealings of petty traders bargaining for twenty quarters
of wheat or for the payment of a £5 debt. In such cases a false
prominence is given the wager of law, a survival from the middle
ages when men and transactions were local and known to all, but
which had long been obviated in transactions of importance by the
bond or statutory recognisance. The hypothesis is best supported
by the marriage settlements that play their part in the evolution of
the informal contract. Transactions such as these were by no means
new: lands, often of immense value, and money had for centuries
been assured by parents on the marriage couple, using the standard
procedures of bonds and counter-bonds, simultaneous fines, or feoff-
ments on condition. No instruments are more common in family
archives. The settlements litigated in the common law courts of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, on the other hand, seem with-
out exception to be concerned only with small estates and to mirror
only unsophisticated suitors and their parents acting in the absence
of legal, or even of reasonably- informed, advice.
A law of contracts that lags behind the growth of commercial
activity presents an awkward stumbling block to the acceptance of
a theory of roughly concomitant social and legal change, but in fact
the lag is illusory. Commercial transactions were handled by means
of self-executing, medieval forms ingeniously adapted to post-
medieval enterprises. Consequently the run of commercial cases by-
passed the common law courts, for defences to a bond under seal
or to an execution sued on a statutory recognisance had of necessity
to be heard in chancery. If relief could not be had there, a seven-
teenth century chancery reporter noted, 'men would do that by
covenant which now they do by bond'. Under such conditions, con-
tract doctrine remained undeveloped and inadequate: Blackstone's
treatment of contracts does not quite fill one chapter, and that is
hidden in a volume devoted to property and conveyancing; Lord
Mansfield looked for contract theory to Pothier, chancery practices,
mercantile usages, and natural law. Only later to come into its own,
the law of contracts then was provided with a history; if prior to
the late eighteenth century the informal contract was not the form
commercial agreements took, that history cannot fail to be confused,
disappointing, and economically anachronistic.
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I pass over the well-worn subject of the sixteenth century
legitimation of interest, though it aptly illustrates the title of this
paper, and mention only in passing the series of Tudor bankruptcy
statutes and acts against fraudulent conveyances that constitute
direct legal responses to growing commercial sophistication. The
connection between social change and precedent is not quite that
clear.
Medieval political and legal thought reflect essentially a society
not yet complicated by problems beyond meum et tuum and secure
in an ethic, accepted by all, based upon the solid bedrock of un-
differentiated and universal belief. Under such conditions, the
hypothesis that justice provided the ultimate touchstone of human
behaviour, and was an ascertainable absolute to be recognized by
reason in every case with immediately apprehended confidence,
was not an untenable one. If reason worked well enough in an
essentially static society, or one in which the rate of change was
slow, the sixteenth century found it not altogether an advantage
to be ruled by a judge's intuitive feeling for what was right. In
the first year of our hundred-year period it was pointed out that
'our law ys infynyte and without ordur or end. Ther ys no stabyl
grounde therin nor sure stay, but everye one that can coloure reson
makyth a stope to the best law that ys before tyme devysed. There
is no stabyl ground in our commyn law to leyne unto and the jugys
are not bounden, as a rule, but aftur theyr owne lyberty they have
authoritye to juge as the cyrcumstance of the cause doth them
move.' Those engaged in trade, whether of lands or goods, would
be particularly interested in what Max Weber called 'the calcula-
bility of chances', preferring prediction to ethical imperatives no
longer either clearly enunciated or unambiguous. Francis Bacon's
experience in chancery, the court to which most commercial cases
came, led him to insist that certainty was the primary necessity of
law, nor is he here to be contrasted with Coke, who substantially
delimited the 'reason' of the middle ages when he recognized that
'causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods or fortunes
of subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the arti-
ficial reason and judgment of the law'. If in 1502 Bracton's (and
Justinian's) well-known adage 'non exemplis; sed rationibus adjudi-
candum est' could still be cited with approval, by 1602 precedent,
a word which appears first in 1557, was becoming a small but recog-
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nizable part of judicial technique. Still far from Lord Mansfield,
and farther from the industrialized nineteenth century's insistence
on predictability, it is nevertheless difficult to escape the fact that
rudimentary but none the less real principles of certainty and of
the consistency of decision were coming into use.
This already over-long paper may be aptly brought to a close
by four quotations which seem to me to raise a fundamental question
-the separation of law from ethics. In 1370: 'Nam licet in
rescripto principis exprimatur, ut judex recusari non possit, nihilo-
minus ex justa causa poterit recusari. Recusatio enim species est
defensionis, quam, cum sit de jure naturae, princeps in suo rescripto
etiam expresse tollere nequit. Manifestum est, quod cum voluntas
principis ab aequitate, justitia et ratione deviet, non est lex. In
1503: 'si le roy granta a une home destre justice de peas licet
ipsemet sit pars, cest grant est void.' In 1606: 'One cannot be judge
in his own case, and it appears in our books that in many cases the
common law will control acts of parliament and adjudge them to
be utterly void'. In 1765: 'if an act of parliament gives a man
power to try all causes that arise within his manor of Dale, yet if
a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is con-
strued not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any
man should determine his own quarrel. Yet if we should conceive
it possible for the parliament to enact that he should try as well
his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that has
power to defeat the legislature when couched in such evident and
express words as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the
legislature or no'.
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